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COMPARISON OF HIGH AND LOW ACHIEVERS:
A Discussion of Juter’s (2007) article1
T. P. Hutchinson2
Centre for Automotive Safety Research, University of Adelaide, Australia

Abstract: The use of questionnaires and interviews to compare the responses to a mathematical
task of high achievers with low achievers has limitations. The partial information that they have
provides a way of comparing high and low achievers. Some references are given here to relevant
task formats and theories. An example is given of how examinees’ performance with unusual task
formats (specifically, answer-until-correct) may be analysed to throw light on the mathematical
description of partial information.
Keywords: answer until correct tasks; research methodology; questionnaire analysis; task
formats;
1. Introduction
Juter (2007) compared high achieving students with low achieving students in respect of
performance on problems concerned with limits of functions. Juter made use of questionnaires
and interviews, and results were presented in the form of examples of responses given by high
achievers and by low achievers. Presenting results in that way, and concluding that “high
achievers have richer concept images” and their “abstraction abilities were more highly
developed” (Juter, 2007, p. 64) does have some interest. But these descriptions do not say much
more than that students who knew more about limits did, indeed, know more about limits --- the
attempt at analysis is almost circular. Section 2 below will suggest some ways of comparing high
achievers with low achievers that avoid this circularity. Section 3 gives an example of how
empirical results (specifically, in an answer-until-correct task) may be compared with theories.
2. Discussion of Juter (2007)
The concern noted above may also be expressed as follows. On any single performance measure,
high achievers are likely to score better than low achievers. This is unlikely to be of great interest
on its own. An interesting research question is likely to involve two measures, and to concern
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how the between-group difference on one measure relates to the between-group difference on
another measure. Exactly what these questions are and how they can be answered will naturally
depend on what the different observed measures are; an example will be given in Section 3.
Instead of taking a numerical difference, one might put high achievers and low achievers on an
equal footing in one respect, and then compare something else: instead of comparing responses
by high achievers with responses by low achievers, compare wrong responses by high achievers
with wrong responses by low achievers, and (separately) compare correct responses by high
achievers with correct responses by low achievers.
 Do high achievers and low achievers differ in the wrong responses they give? In cases
where one wrong response is considered less wrong than another, do high achievers tend
to give the less wrong response? (Juter refers to embodied, proceptual, and formal modes
of mathematical thinking. This might be the basis for classifying one wrong response as
less wrong than another.) If a second attempt is permitted following a wrong response, do
high achievers tend to do better than low achievers?
 If an explanation of a correct response is asked for, is its quality better for high achievers
than for low achievers? If confidence in a correct response is asked for, is it higher for
high achievers than for lows achievers?
Once like is being compared with like, then it is reasonable to ask about richness of concept or
abstraction, provided they can be operationalized and measured.
Most research into different wrong responses, performance at second attempt, and supplementary
questioning has been based on multiple-choice items. Selection of different wrong responses by
different ability groups in multiple-choice tests is discussed by Green et al. (1989), Price (1964),
Wainer (1983), Wainer et al. (1984), and Hutchinson (1991, Sections 5.17, 8.6, 9.3, 9.4). When
responses are generated (constructed) by examinees, there are often so many possible wrong
responses that it is difficult to aggregate and classify them. However, Cairns et al. (2002) found
evidence that some wrong responses are disproportionately generated by examinees of high
ability and others disproportionately generated by examinees of lower ability.
As well as the nature of wrong responses and performance at second attempt, other topics that
have been studied include performance when “don’t know” is one of the available options,
performance when “none of the above” is one of the available options, performance when none
of the available options are correct, performance when more than one option is correct, the
changing of responses by examinees, and the confidence that the examinee expresses. Unusual
task formats are sometimes considered to have both practical utility and psychological interest, in
that they reveal more about the examinee than “choose the one correct, or best, answer” does.
But the practical utility is debatable, as administration time tends to be longer --- if extra time is
feasible, it might be better to set more items of conventional format. (Concerning confidence, it
may be noted that although there is some plausibility in the idea that high achievers will tend to
know they are correct, and low achievers will not, there are great complications: people may
differ in how they use the scale of confidence, how well they know themselves, and how honest
they are in reporting. For example, among the four students discussed by Juter, 2005, it was the
best student who was the only one who was unsure whether she had control over the notion of a
limit.)
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Two further comments are worth making. (a) Some researchers have asked examinees to
describe their thought processes. Unfortunately, it is particularly difficult to say anything about
low achievers. Williams and Jones (1972) reported an interview survey of 15 schoolchildren who
had taken a mathematics test, but found that not much information could be gleaned from the
weaker students. See also Section 5.18 of Hutchinson (1991). (b) As previously noted,
examinees’ performance with unusual task formats holds some value for psychological theory. I
urge those who have used such task formats to look carefully at the resulting dataset for any
implications it may hold. Examples of comparing datasets with a theory that seeks to
operationalize the notion of partial information are in Chapters 6 and 7 of Hutchinson (1991),
and another is given in Section 3 below. (However, the data typically need to be aggregated --e.g., over all examinees within a certain band of abilities --- and it is not certain that what is seen
at the aggregate level is also the case for an individual examinee. For other limitations of the
approach, see Chapter 8 of Hutchinson, 1991.)
Thus it seems that methods concentrating on individual examinees (discussing responses to
particular questions, as Juter did, or asking about thought processes), and methods that employ
large samples and aggregated data, each have strengths and weaknesses.
3. Example of quantitative study of partial information
Suppose there is data on examinees’ performance with an unusual task format. Sometimes a
simple feature of the data is directly of interest. For example, is second-choice performance only
at the chance level? Or, do the proportions with which different incorrect options are selected
differ when examinees are grouped according to ability? On other occasions, a quantitative
prediction is the centre of attention, as in the following example.
In answer-until-correct (AUC) tests, the examinee is given immediate feedback as to whether the
response is correct; if it is wrong, then the examinee chooses another option, and again is given
immediate feedback; the examinee continues until the correct option is chosen, then moves on to
the next item. The dataset to be discussed is from Abplanalp (1995). That paper had much about
the practicalities of AUC testing, and some interesting data, but lacked any theory to give context
to the data. Consider the relationship between the number of errors when the test is scored
conventionally and when using the AUC method. Figure 1 shows Abplanalp’s data, which was
from a test of 22 items having 5 options each, taken by 74 examinees. The horizontal axis shows
the average number of wrong options chosen per item when using the AUC format, and the
vertical axis shows the proportion of items answered correctly at first attempt.
Let y be the probability of answering correctly at first attempt, and x be the average number of
wrong options chosen per item. Further, let m be the number of options per item. The limits on
the relationship between x and y are as follows.
 If, whenever a second attempt is needed, the examinee is always correct at second
attempt, x = 1 - y.
 If the examinee always chooses the correct option last whenever it is not chosen first, x =
(m-1)(1-y).
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The two extremes are shown as dashed lines in Figure 1, as in Abplanalp’s Figure 3.
The simplest theory for the relationship between x and y is based on assuming that the
examinee’s subsequent attempts are equivalent to random guesses whenever the first choice is
wrong. Then x = m(1-y)/2. When m is 5 (as in Abplanalp’s test), this leads to y = (5 - 2x)/5, and
this is the straight line in Figure 1. It can be seen that most of the data points lie below this. That
is, the examinees, if they are wrong at first attempt, take fewer attempts to find the correct
response than they would if they had no knowledge. (At any given y, we can look across and see
that the data points have a smaller x than would be expected if the examinees had no
knowledge.) We might say the examinees have some degree of partial information about the
item.
Alternative predictions arise from the following approach. (For more details, see Hutchinson,
1982, 1991, 1997.) Suppose that the examinee considers each option within each item, and that
each option within each item gives rise to some feeling as to the degree to which it fails to match
the question posed. At first attempt, the examinee will choose the option generating the lowest
feeling of mismatch. If the first choice turns out to be wrong, so that a second attempt is
necessary, the option generating the second-lowest feeling of mismatch is chosen. And so on.
Now suppose that the mismatch for the correct options is taken from some probability
distribution, and that the mismatches for the wrong options are taken independently from some
other probability distribution. The distribution for the wrong options will have a higher mean
than that for the correct options. Indeed, the difference between the means is a measure of the
examinee’s ability. Let the probability of the mismatch exceeding z be F(z) for correct options
and G(z) for wrong options. Further, let f be the probability density of mismatch for correct
options, f = -dF/dz.
 The probability of being correct at first attempt is the probability that the mismatch from
the correct option is some value z, multiplied by the probability of all of the mismatches
from the wrong options (there are m - 1 of them) being greater than z, integrated over all
z.
 If the mismatch from the correct option is z, the proportion of mismatches from wrong
options that are less than z is 1 - G(z), and the expected number of them is (1 - G(z)) (m1). Averaging over different values of z is achieved via another integration.
Let  be some measure of how different G is from F, that is, a measure of the examinee’s ability
--- it might, for instance, be the difference between the means of the distributions. Once an
assumption has been made about what F and G are, the integrations referred to above lead to an
equation for y in terms of  and an equation for x in terms of . Then the equation for y in terms
of x is obtained by elimination of .
To get a definite prediction, it is necessary to make some specific assumption about what F and
G are. Three examples that are easy algebraically are as follows.
 Exponential distributions. Here, mismatch is taken to have an exponential distribution
with mean 1 in the case of a correct option, and an exponential distribution with mean 
(this being greater than 1) in the case of wrong options. In the case of m = 5, this leads to
y = (4 - x)/(4 + 3x).
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All-or-none knowledge. Mismatch is taken to have uniform distributions, with the upper
end of the range being the same for the wrong options as for the correct option. For m =
5, y = (5 - 2x)/5, as given earlier.
 Recognisable distractors. Mismatch is taken to have uniform distributions, with the lower
end of the range being the same for the wrong options as for the correct option. For m =
5, y = [1 - (1 - x/2)5]/(5x/2). This is quite the opposite to the previous model, in the sense
that now a wrong option is sometimes recognised as being wrong, but the correct option
is never positively identified as such. This assumption has found occasional application
in the psychological literature (Murdock, 1963; see also Section 4.6 of Hutchinson,
1991).
It may be asked how different are the three models, and whether Abplanalp’s data favour one in
preference to the others. The relationships between y and x are plotted in Figure 1. It appears that
examinees have some degree of information when they give a wrong answer initially, but that it
is rather less useful than is implied by the “recognisable distractors” and “exponential” theories.

Figure 1. Data from Abplanalp (1995) compared with the predictions of three theories; y is the
probability of answering correctly at first attempt, and x is the average number of wrong options
chosen per item
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